In 2001, a scheme called Citizen Community Board (CCB), a kind of community-based organization (CBO), was introduced in Pakistan, under which local people propose to the local government development projects through forming a CCB and upon approval the local government funds 80% of the project cost. Since 2001, however, both the number of CCBs and that of approved projects have been below the expected level. This raises a concern that the Pakistani society with limited historical experience in CBO-based development is too handicapped for the CCB scheme to be successful. Since 2004, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) has been implementing a project to make the CCB program more effective and efficient, with Hafizabad District as a target district. This paper first summarizes the results of statistical analyses regarding the determinants of successful formation of a CCB and those of successful development activities conditional on the formation. This is based on the data we collected in a benchmark survey before JICA's intervention. The regression results show that rules within a CCB and the type of leadership are key to the success of CCB initiative, suggesting that the capacity building of CCBs and local communities is important. Then in the second part of the paper, we summarize the achievements of JICA's intervention during the year 2005-06. Our experiences show the effectiveness of field facilitators, supporting the view that the capacity building is indeed the constraint.
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, a scheme called Citizen Community Board (CCB), a kind of community-based organization (CBO), was introduced in Pakistan as a devolution policy, under which local people propose to the local government development projects through forming a CCB and upon approval the local government funds 80% of the project cost. Since 2001, however, both the number of CCBs and that of approved projects have been below the expected level. This raises a concern that the Pakistani society with limited historical experience in CBO-based development is too handicapped for the CCB scheme to be successful. Although the number of empirical studies on Pakistan's CCB scheme has been increasing [e.g., see Cheema and Mohmand (2004) , Cheema et al (2006) ], our understanding on conditions for a success of such schemes is limited. This paper thus attempts to analyze the conditions in the context of community and economic development in Pakistan from Japanese Perspectives.
Japan did not achieve the current level of well-being quickly. A long period of efforts to catch-up to the US exists before we reach the current level. At the time of Meiji Restoration in 1868, when the Japanese economy began its modernization effort, the economy totally depended on agriculture and the living conditions were desperately low, much poorer than the level enjoyed by Pakistani people in the 1970s [Maddison (2003) ]. From this humble beginning, the Japanese economy grew to the current level. In our growth experience, the community played a significant role [Hirashima and Gooneratne (1996) , Ohkama and Kikuchi (1996) , Hayami and Godo (2005) ]. Especially, the community's role was critically important in providing basic social services such as primary education [JICA (2004) ]. The most important geographic unit for such community initiatives is "Gyosei Son" (administrative village), which roughly corresponds to "Union" in Pakistan today. Because of this background, we expect that Japanese perspectives may have useful implications to the current case of Pakistan.
1 This expectation motivates this paper.
The role of community in economic development has been one of the focal issues in the theory of development economics as well [Hayami and Godo (2005) ]. Devolution initiatives with community as a key actor are expected to contribute to efficiency, accountability, and transparency of poverty reduction policies through the utilization of local information and resources and nurturing the sense of ownership [Bardhan (2002) ]. However, as Bardhan and Mukherjee (2000, 2005) show theoretically, such initiatives may be vulnerable to the capture by local elites. Whether the decentralization and local participation improve the welfare of disadvantaged people thus becomes an empirical question. According to the survey by Mansuri and Rao (2004) , the evidence on whether devolution improved targeting and public goods formation is mixed but tends to be positive under enabling institutional environment.
Another strand of related literature is empirical studies on the determinants of collective action to manage common property resources [see Bandiera et al. (2005) for a recent survey].
The existing studies have shown that as determinants of collective action (especially in irrigation), focal variables include social heterogeneity, group size, asset inequality, and leadership. Most studies find that inequality and social heterogeneity are detrimental to successful collective action.
With these two strands of literature as theoretical background, this paper presents a case study of CCBs in Hafizabad District, Punjab. Since 2004, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) has been implementing a project to make the CCB program more A Japanese development project with similar motivation was successful in Indonesia in making the community-based and community-driven development more sustainable. See Kawamura (2005) . 
JICA'S DEVOLUTION SUPPORT PROJECT IN HAFIZABAD
Pakistan is characterized by a moderate success in economic growth with a substantial failure in human development such as basic health, education and gender equality.
Underlying this situation is a society with unequal distribution of income and assets where the core network is based on familial, clan, and tribal relations, with limited historical experience in CBO-based cooperation in development efforts [JICA (2003) ]. Hafizabad is a small district on the bank of Chenab River [Kurosaki (2005) ]. It has 42
unions/towns and contains 428 villages/circles. The district was separated from Gujranwala District in 1993. The landscape is very flat throughout the district and the majority of farmland is irrigated. The main monsoon crop is Basmati rice and the main winter crop is wheat, both of which are cultivated simultaneously with various fodder crops for livestock, mostly cows and buffaloes. Hafizabad is known as a typical Punjab society dominated by a few big landlords and numerous owner-farmers, with substantial landless rural population [GHK (2005)]. Agricultural census data also show that land tenancy in Hafizabad is more frequently found than in other parts of Punjab [Kurosaki (2005) , Table 1 ].
As a product of joint efforts by JICA-DSP and Hafizabad District Government, the Centering at the CCB Support Centre, the following activities were implemented: 
DETERMINANTS OF THE CCB'S SUCCESS/FAILURE

Data
In this section, we utilize a dataset compiled from the socio-economic survey of Unions 
Empirical Models
Villagers organize collective action to form a CCB when their expected benefit from CCB registration is greater than its costs. Benefits and costs of such collective action depend on the village and Union characteristics such as economic and political activities, infrastructure, and leadership [Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) ]. Thus, the determinants of successful formation of a CCB are analyzed by a village-level regression model:
where Y i is the dummy variable for village i to have a CCB, X k is a vector of the characteristics of Union k to which village i belongs, X i is a vector of the village characteristics, b 1 and b 2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated, u i is a zero-mean error term, and f(.) is a probit, logit, or linear function.
Once a CCB is formed, CCB members organize collective action to prepare a CCB project draft. To prepare the draft successfully, the members need to coordinate potentially conflicting interests among them and to satisfy technical specifications required from the local government as an acceptable proposal for fund allocation. Therefore, the success of such collective action can be modeled by a CCB-level regression model:
where Y j is the dummy variable for CCB j to organize collective action successfully (proposal drafted or submitted), X j is a vector of the CCB characteristics (inequality, group size, heterogeneity, leadership, CCB rules, etc.).
Determinants of CCB Formation
The estimation results of equation (1) suggesting that the number of UC meeting is not related with CCB promotion.
The factors discussed so far are determinants of the supply side of collective action in CCB formation. The demand side, i.e., the variables determining people's needs, has to be controlled for. Therefore, indicators for service delivery are included such as the number of schools, health workers, housing facilities, and the distance to banks and post offices. Among these variables, those with statistical significance have expected signs: villages in a Union with fewer schools (schlden) and more difficulty in bank access (d_bank) are more likely to form a CCB. 
Determinants of the Successful Preparation of a CCB Project Proposal
Once a CCB is formed, the next step is to prepare a proposal for CCB projects. Under what conditions, CCB members are successful in coordinating collective action that results in an acceptable project proposal? Estimation results based on equation (2) are summarized in Table 2 . To examine different aspects of project preparation, we choose two dependent variables: a dummy for the preparation of a project proposal draft and a dummy for the submission of the proposal. Since submission is conditional on the draft preparation, it may be desirable to estimate a model of sequential decision making. As the first step to approach the desirable model, equation (2) is estimated for each of these dependent variables with the same explanatory variables. In other words, a completely reduced-form approach is adopted.
The estimation results show that among the village-and Union-level variables, those with statistical significance have the same sign as in Table 1 . Residents' literacy (litrate) and the Union's disadvantage in the access to banks (d_bank) both increase the probability of successful preparation and submission of a CCB project proposal. The presence of NGO (ngo) increases the probability but the effect is statistically significant only at the stage of proposal submission. Other Union-level variables and village-level variables are mostly insignificant.
Among CCB-level variables, several variables have coefficients that are congruent across specifications. First, the collective action for project finalization takes time: ccb_age has a positive coefficient. Second, CCB's management and rules matter. Those CCBs holding a meeting regularly (d_meet) are more likely to prepare a draft and to submit the proposal;
those CCBs not recording their activities properly (miss_gen) are less likely to prepare a draft and to submit the proposal, though the latter effect on the submission was statistically significant only at the 20% level.
Third, the group size (num_mem) and the number of occupations among members (n_occp) have positive coefficients on proposal preparation and negative coefficients on proposal submission. Among them, the positive effect of n_occp on the preparation and the negative effect of num_mem on the submission are statistically significant. The negative effect of the member size is consistent with the findings in the majority of studies on collective action in irrigation management [Bandiera et al. (2005) ]. Positive and significant effects of n_occp (the number of occupations among members) on the preparation of project proposals are against the findings in the literature that the social heterogeneity among members is detrimental to collective action [Bandiera et al. (2005) ]. The regression result seems to suggest that the superiority in technical skills of more heterogeneous CCBs surpasses the disadvantage of such CCBs in terms of maintaining cooperation. In this sense, the regression result shows the lack of technical support from the CCB administration in preparing project proposals. However, at the stage of proposal submission, n_occp has a negative and insignificant effect on collective action, suggesting a possibility that the ill effect of n_occp appear at this stage that requires more coordination among CCB members because the submission of the proposal implies the official commitment of local people to pay 20% of the project cost.
Inequality in land holding among CCB members (ineq_ld) seems detrimental to the submission of the proposal although its effect is only marginally significant in the statistical sense. It may also capture the effects of the leadership through land holding (lead_lnd). The coefficient on lead_lnd is positive on d_pdft but negative on d_subm, both of which are statistically significant only at the 10% level. This suggests a possibility that the effect of land inequality on collective action may differ depending on the stage of project preparation. This requires further research since the results here are weak and mixed.
The coefficients on womenr (the ratio of female CCB members) and lead_sex (a dummy for a female chairman) are negative but not statistically significant at all. This result shows that the disadvantage of female-dominated CCBs is not discernible, which may be a good sign considering the gender context of Pakistan.
IMPACT OF INTERVENTIONS UNDER THE JICA-DSP PROJECT
The regression results in the previous section thus show that rules within a CCB and the type of leadership are key to the success of a CCB initiative. This finding suggests that the capacity building of CCBs and local communities, through technical and institutional support, is important. Under these conditions, JICA-DSP and Hafizabad District Government initiated the CIP (see Section 2 for its components).
As of November 2006, immediately after the second phase of the CIP was initiated, 242
CCBs were registered, including 93 that were registered newly under the JICA-DSP. Figure 1 shows the number of newly-registered CCBs in Hafizabad in three-month intervals from On June 2006, thirteen proposals were approved by the District Government. These proposals were for livestock development, vocational schools, and ambulance provision.
Their total budget was 2.8 million Rs. At the time of this writing, twenty-two more proposals were waiting for the approval. They covered more diverse activities, including enhancement of school and health facilities and amounting to 5.4 million Rs.
These numbers show that one of the CIP's objective, i.e., to increase the number of CCB activities, was achieved successfully, although a more rigorous evaluation based on a comparison with scientific counterfactuals should be conducted for a definite conclusion. In promoting villagers' cooperation toward a CCB, village visits and meetings by CCB
Coordinators were found to be very effective. This is consistent with the statistical finding in Section 3 that local leadership and NGO guidance are positive predictors of CCB formation.
In addition, this seems to suggest that JICA's experiences in Indonesia [Kawamura (2005) The progress in increasing the amount of budget released by the government was steady but modest. An immediate task for the second phase of the CIP is thus to accelerate the approval process. The statistical finding in Section 3 that technical skills are lacking in the local people to prepare acceptable proposals is relevant in this context as well. Therefore, the next task is to implement the remaining projects on time and to monitor them properly. By evaluating these projects and derive lessons for the next phase will complete the second phase, currently going-on.
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the conditions for a successful community-based, communitydriven development in Pakistan. The analysis was based on a case study of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) in Hafizabad, Pakistan, where Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is implementing a project to make the CCB program more effective and efficient.
Based on regression analyses using benchmark data before JICA's intervention, we found that villages in Unions with higher literacy rates, with presence of NGOs in the Union and influential persons in the village, and with less access to schools and financial institutions are more likely to be successful in forming a CCB. The determinants of successful preparation of CCB development projects conditional on the CCB formation include the age of a CCB, more strict management (regular meeting and record keeping), and more technical skills (diversity in members' occupation). The effects of education, gender, and inequality on the project success probability were not clearly discernible, although a negative effect of land inequality on project submission was found. The statistical analyses thus seem to show that CCB-based collective action is possible even in the Pakistani society where the core network is not based on local residential areas, under the condition with favorable factors found in the regression analysis.
The implementation of the CCB Improvement Plan jointly by JICA and Hafizabad District Government shows a moderate success with respect to the objective of increasing CCB activities and to increasing the amount of budget released by the government on time. In promoting villagers' cooperation toward a CCB, village visits and meetings by CCB Coordinators were found to be very effective, confirming the view that local leadership and NGO guidance are important. Considering the lack of such human resources in Pakistan, a further investment in capacity building is required.
Our experiences in Pakistan so far suggest that, in order to make the CCB (or participatory development in general) more sustainable in terms of planning, implementing, and monitoring, it is imperative to increase pro-poor components with active participation of the poor and the landless. In other words, to make CCB-type cooperation in development efforts possible in rural Pakistan, we need to pay sufficient attention to the heterogeneity of the local people (the depth of socio-economic gap among classes) and the potential of civil society institutions such as NGOs and the local elite in mobilizing the people.
One caveat of these conclusions is that they are derived from statistical relations among cross-section data and from our subjective observations in the field. The causality may be opposite to the one assumed in this paper. For example, interventions by CCB Coordinators and the local response to them are formed endogenously so that the characteristics of CCBs may reflect the process of endogenous matching. To elicit the true causal effects of these CCB characteristics and JICA's intervention on the CCB performance, we need exogenous variation. A rigorous evaluation based on such exogenous variation is left for further research. (1) "n.s." indicates that the variable has a statistically insignificant coefficient (at the 10% level) in all specifications. "(+)" indicates that the variable has a positive coefficient in all specifications but statistically significant (at the 10% level) in only some of them. "(++)" indicates that the variable has a positive and significant coefficient in all specifications with statistical significance levels at 5 to 10%. "(+++)" indicates that the variable has a positive and significant coefficient in all specifications with statistical significance levels at 1%. "(-)" indicates that the variable has a negative coefficient in all specifications but statistically significant (at the 10% level) in only some of them. "(--)" indicates that the variable has a negative and significant coefficient in all specifications with statistical significance levels at 5 to 10%. "(---)" indicates that the variable has a negative and significant coefficient in all specifications with statistical significance levels at 1%.
(2) In addition the variables listed above, two Union-level dummy variables controlling for data quality were also included.
Source: Adapted from Kurosaki (2005) , Table 4 . 
